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Non-Technical Summary
Transition of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to func-
tioning market economies creates new investment opportunities. A decade ago capital markets
were almost absent in all CEE countries but they are developing rapidly. At the end of the
1990s institutional investors from Western countries are present in the equity and bond mar-
kets of the largest CEE economies. However, deficits in the economic and institutional setting
still restrict foreign investment in CEE countries.
This study examines the determinants of portfolio investment conducted by Western institu-
tional investors in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia as the five
CEE candidates to the European Union. In addition, Russia is included as the largest country
in Eastern Europe. The study focuses on the pull-factors of portfolio investment, i.e. analyzes
the attractiveness of CEE capital markets from the perspective of Western investors.
The analysis draws on data from a recent survey conducted among portfolio managers of
Western investment funds, an increasingly important type of institutional investor. The ap-
proach of this study is two-fold: First, criteria for portfolio investment and current barriers to
higher investment in CEE countries are identified. Second, the CEE portfolio structure of
Western investment funds is explained making use of detailed grading data from the survey.
The results suggest that fund managers check a whole catalogue of criteria. Most important
are stability of the financial and legal system, managerial competency and liquidity of the
stock market. But liquidity as a prerequisite for instantaneous exit from any investment is re-
11 Introduction
World-wide, the share of assets which is managed by investment funds, pension funds and
1
portfolio investment 
2
3
1
 See for example the OECD country reports on the Czech Republic (OECD 1998a), on Hungary (1997a), on
Poland (1999a), on Russia (1997b) and on Slovenia (1997c).
2
 In section 3 we show that foreign investment in the bond markets of the CEE countries is highly correlated with
investment in the equity markets. Therefore, we assume that the criteria for both forms of investment are similar.
3
 American Depository Receipts (ADR) and Global Depositary Receipts (GDR) are dollar-denominated certifi-
cates which represent shares of non-US companies but are traded, cleared and settled in the same way as US
securities. The receipts were created in the late 1920s to facilitate US investor purchases of non-US securities
and to allow non-US stock to be traded in the US. By May 1999, over 3.8 billion US$ were invested in ADR and
GDR programs of CEE enterprises (Budapest Business Journal 1999: 14). GDR programs dominate because
GDRs give companies better access to European and other non-US investors than ADRs.
2kets. 4 Since we are particularly interested in the functioning of domestic equity markets we
also neglect foreign direct investment. 5
For this study we make use of a unique source of data. From April to June 1999 the Center for
European Economic Research (ZEW) conducted a survey among Western portfolio managers.
Since they are active participants in CEE equity and bond markets we are able to draw on up-
to-date information about the current state and problems of the CEE transition process.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set-up of the survey and the data
we obtained. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the results from the survey. Whereas
section 3 is primarily descriptive, section 4 provides empirical results on the determinants of
portfolio investment in CEE countries from regression analysis. Section 5 concludes with
some remarks on the policy implications for institutional change in CEE countries.
2 Data
The data used in this study were obtained through a survey which the Center for European
Economic Research (ZEW) conducted from April to June 1999. Survey participants were
Western portfolio managers who are responsible for investment in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE). Hence, we asked active market participants who are experts in CEE equity and bond
markets. Intent of the survey was to find out what criteria fund managers use for their invest-
ment in CEE countries and what barriers to investment currently exist from their point of
view.
The questionnaire was sent to 119 fund managers from 80 different funds which specialized
in CEE countries.6 To increase the response rate all recipients of the questionnaire were con-
tacted by phone in advance. In total, 21 questionnaires were sent back from 19 different
funds.7 This is equal to a response rate of about 24 percent. At the end of the year 1998 these
                                                
4
 Hence we neglect the push-factors, e.g. liquidity of the funds, degree of competition in the fund industry etc)
which can drive foreign portfolio investment.
5
 According to EU law foreign investment is labeled as direct investment when the investor buy more than 10
percent of the shares of the investment target. Share stakes below 10 percent are labeled portfolio investment.
6
 The full questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.
7
 Each recipient was additionally contacted up to three times by phone when he/she had not yet sent back the
survey. However, the response rate of 23.75 percent (defined as responding funds as a percentage of all CEE
funds) could not be increased further. Mostly the fund managers indicated severe time constraints.
3funds managed about 2,300 million Euro invested in stocks and bonds in the CEE countries. 8
World-wide the total of their investment amounted to 1,100 billion Euro.
9
3 Descriptive Results
10
Table 1: Portfolio Structure of Western Investment Funds (end of 1998)
Czech Re-
public
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia Total
Shares 16.1 36.6 34.4 1.4 0.7 10.8 100.0
Bonds 14.9 40.7 27.8 0.9 0.6 15.1 100.0
8
 This number is only a lower bound because not all respondents wanted to answer on this item.
9
 For grading only 20 criteria were given. The catalogue of criteria to be graded was also changed a little to
maximize the information on the financial markets (see Appendix). Since our respondents are experts in finan-
cial markets, information on these criteria will be of particularly high value.
10
 Only a very small fraction of total capital invested in Central and Eastern Europe was not invested in any of
the six countries covered in this study.
4Therefore the results of this study which focuses on the stock markets and their institutional
settings should also be relevant for the bond markets.11
3.1 Relevance of the Criteria
The survey participants were asked to rank each criterion according to its relevance for their
investment decisions. Table 2 lists the criteria by their degree of importance as assigned by
the respondents.
Table 2: Most Important Criteria for Portfolio Investment Decisions
Classification Criteria
General • Stability of legal system (83%)
• Stability of financial system (81%)
• Stability of political system (78%)
• Currency stability (68%)
• Clear tax legislation (63%)
• General economic situation (62%)
• Strictness of bankruptcy laws (59%)
Microeconomic • Managerial qualification (93%)
• Productivity of the investment target (83%)
• Growth of the particular sector (83%)
• Skill level of employees of the investment target (65%)
• Personal contacts with management (65%)
• Level of taxation of the investment target (53%)
Financial Markets • Liquidity of the individual stocks (97%)
• Legislation and enforcement of law (83%)
• Controls on capital flow (78%)
• Presence of strategic investors (53%)
• Listing at a foreign exchange (52%)
Notes: Average degree of importance on a scale of 0-100 %in brackets. The degree of importance is obtained
by calculating the average over all responses on each criterion. Then the results are scaled to be in the range of
0% (unimportant) to 100% (very important). Less important criteria are not tabled. The full questionnaire can be
found in the Appendix.
Table 2 shows that institutional investors check a whole range of criteria before they buy as-
sets in a CEE country. Macro- and microeconomic criteria are important as well as the general
political environment and the institutional setting of financial markets.
11
 We will come back to this aspect in our concluding remarks.
5share of state ownership in the investment target (45 percent) and the presence of other insti-
tutional investors (43 percent).
On the microeconomic side, portfolio investors look for highly qualified management teams.
Particularly in the former centrally planned economies this is a crucial factor because the eco-
nomic environment is still changing rapidly. Competent decisions regarding the allocation of
capital and labor are needed (Frydman et al., 1997). But also productivity and growth are es-
sential. From the financial market perspective, liquidity of the individual stock is the domi-
nant criterion. Institutional investors like investment funds generally have a strong preference
for liquid assets (Blommestein, 1998). In Central and Eastern Europe this might be of par-
ticular relevance because in some countries 12 exit from the investment is hindered by special
rules. At the same time they demand clear and fair legislation. As non-domestic investors they
must rely on the complete enforcement of law. Otherwise they face a strong disadvantage
compared with domestic investors.
3.2 Country Performance on the Criteria
The respondents were also asked to assign each of the six countries a grade on all criteria.
Table 3 gives the average grade each country received in the three main categories. Thereby a
13
Table 3: General Assessment of the CEE countries
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia
General and Macroeconomic 3.88 2.07 2.27 2.44 2.58 5.84
Microeconomic 4.06 2.50 3.40 2.93 3.08 4.67
Financial Markets 3.57 2.23 2.51 3.11 4.05 5.01
Mean 3.84 2.27 2.73 2.83 3.24 5.17
Number of observations 21 21 21 21 21 21
Notes: Average grades received on a scale from 1 (excellent) to 6 (failed), weighted by the importance of
each criterion as stated by the respondents. For details on the content of each category see below.
12
 For example, investors in Slovenia cannot sell any amount of equity instantaneously. In addition, since early
1997 foreign exchange flows must go through client accounts opened in banks with full banking licenses
(OECD, 1997c: 87).
13
 The grades on each criterion are weighted by the relative importance as stated by the respondents (Table 2).
However, without weighting very similar results were obtained.
6forms best with an average of 2.27, the Czech Republic worst with an average of 3.84. The
very bad grades that Russia received in all three categories stresses the fact that there is still a
large discrepancy to the EU candidates. Russia should therefore be regarded as a special case.
With the exception of the Czech Republic the EU candidates have only minor problems in the
political and macroeconomic sphere. Problems seem to be more severe on the microeconomic
side and in the institutional framework of financial markets. To get a more detailed picture of
the current problems in CEE countries we look at the individual criteria in the next section
(Tables 4-6).
Table 4: Macroeconomic Criteria
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia
Stability of legal system 3.50 2.32 2.81 2.25 3.34 5.72
Stability of financial system 3.64 1.69 1.56 2.25 2.25 6.00
Stability of political system 3.37 1.79 2.18 2.67 2.03 5.74
General economic situation 4.55 2.47 2.05 2.83 2.47 5.87
Bankruptcy law 4.68 2.25 2.91 2.25 2.92 5.85
Weighted average 3.88 2.07 2.27 2.44 2.58 5.84
Notes: The criteria are ranked by their importance as stated by the respondents.
Stability of the legal, political and financial system seems to be sufficient in Hungary, Poland,
Estonia and Slovenia. In general, the continuous process of transforming communist countries
into market economies seems to be a success. Good grades on the macroeconomic situation
support this notion. The most important criterion for the investors, stability of the legal sys-
tem, appears to be slightly weaker in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Striking are the gener-
ally worse grades of the Czech Republic compared to the other four EU candidates. The
hopeless grades on Russia seem to preclude any investment in that country.
Among the five EU candidates, the general economic situation which encompasses inflation,
economic growth and other macroeconomic indicators is also comparatively weak in the
Czech Republic. The current state of the Czech and Russian bankruptcy laws which are of
central importance in times of major industrial restructuring like in CEE countries provoke
dissatisfaction among the investors. Overinvestment and a low rate of firm exits might be a
consequence of this still not acceptable Czech bankruptcy law (OECD, 1998a). Some im-
provements in the legal system and in particular on the bankruptcy codes seem possible in
Poland and Estonia as well.
7Russia fails in almost all criteria. While problems with the Russian political and financial
system are indeed significant,14 the bad grades might heavily be influenced by the Russian
Ruble crises in 1998.
Table 5: Microeconomic Criteria
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia
Managerial Qualification 4.82 2.32 3.65 3.50 2.92 4.97
Productivity 5.03 3.08 4.33 3.14 3.86 5.72
Competitive Pressure 4.09 2.47 3.06 2.73 3.14 4.38
Skill level of workers 2.47 2.25 2.62 2.35 2.17 3.35
Level of Effective Taxation 3.08 2.25 2.94 2.61 3.17 4.47
Weighted average 4.06 2.50 3.40 2.93 3.08 4.67
Notes: The criteria are ranked by their importance as stated by the respondents.
A more diverse picture can be found on the microeconomic side (Table 5). Managerial quali-
fication, the on average most relevant criterion, is the best in Hungary and to a lower extent in
Slovenia. This might be a result of relatively weaker political interference under the commu-
nist regimes in both of these two countries. In contrast, Czech and Russian managers seem to
be only poorly qualified to govern enterprises in times of major restructuring. Likewise, pro-
ductivity as a determinant of the rate of return is judged as low in the Czech Republic, Russia
and also in Poland.
Competition in the product markets is often regarded as a driving factor for productivity.15
Empirical evidence is also accumulating. For Germany Januszewski et al. (1999) show that
firms operating in industries which are characterized by more intensive product market com-
petition tend to see higher rates of productivity growth. Nickell et al. (1997) provide similar
14
 See OECD (1997b) for an extensive survey.
15
 See for example Hart (1983) and Hermalin (1992) for theoretical models.
8Table 6: Financial Market Criteria1
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia
Liquidity 5.08 2.97 3.24 5.53 5.53 4.55
Control on flows of capital 1.66 1.88 2.18 1.83 3.79 4.95
Enforcement of law 3.66 2.09 2.25 2.04 2.25 5.53
Treatment domestic vs. for-
eign investors
3.50 1.63 2.09 2.25 4.54 5.12
Weighted average2 3.57 2.23 2.51 3.11 4.05 5.01
Listing requirements 3.79 2.18 2.47 2.92 3.31 4.68
Clearing and settlement 2.18 1.44 1.88 1.89 3.86 4.68
Protection of minority share-
holders
4.75 2.88 3.97 2.67 3.92 5.26
Disclosure requirements 3.50 1.78 2.09 3.08 3.92 4.91
Trading supervision 4.44 2.72 2.72 3.08 4.08 5.22
Regulation of privatization 4.95 1.92 2.32 2.56 2.88 5.21
Unweighted average3 3.93 2.15 2.57 2.70 3.66 4.99
Notes: 1 In the first part of the table criteria are ranked by their importance as stated by the respondents, in the
second part randomly. 2 Weighted average of the first four criteria. 3 Unweighted average of all criteria.
Special attention was given to financial market criteria because our respondents are experts in
this field. Table 6 consists of two parts: the first part contains the grades on the criteria which
were ranked by the fund managers according to the relevance for their investment decisions.
The second part contains the grades on additional criteria which were not ranked by the fund
managers. 16 The overall result is that Hungary and Poland seem to have the least problems in
their financial markets, whereas problems are again largest in Russia.
Looking at liquidity which was stated to be of highest importance none of the CEE countries
is a good investment target. Even Hungary and Poland performing the best on this criterion
receive only grades of 2.97 and 3.24 respectively. While the fraction of free-floating shares is
quite high, for example in large Polish and Slovenian firms listed on the stock exchange, 17
market capitalization and turnover in all CEE countries is still low compared to Western
economies (FIBV, 1999).18 In addition, instantaneous exit from investment is often barred by
                                                
16
 As can be seen from Table 6, the weighted results are not much different from the unweighted results.
17
 See Budapest Business Journal (1999) for details on the company ownership structures in CEE countries.
18
 For example, at the end of 1998 stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP was 51.3 percent at the
Frankfurt stock exchange, but only 28.9 percent in Hungary and 13.7 percent in Poland (FIBV, 1999).
9particular rules which increase transaction costs (e.g. the requirement to channel foreign ex-
change flows through client accounts in domestic banks).
In contrast, a functioning institutional framework seems (at least partially) to be in place. For
example, an efficient system of clearing and settlement, strict listing requirements and fair
treatment of domestic versus foreign investors can be found in Hungary, Poland and Estonia.
Major deficits are recorded for the Czech Republic and Slovenia regarding the protection of
minority shareholders which Western investment funds usually are. 19 For the Czech Republic,
for example, cases of open fraud through insider trading are reported that violate minority
rights severely (OECD, 1998a). But also the still high stake of the government in Czech, Pol-
ish and Slovenian firms could explain the bad grades on this criterion.
Finally, the portfolio investors want to see improvements in trading supervision and in the
treatment of foreign versus domestic investors in particular in the Czech Republic and Slove-
nia. But also Czech regulation of privatization seems to have major deficits. This result con-
trasts with the situation at the beginning of the 1990s when the Czech Republic served as the
ideal case of privatizing a formerly communist economy.
What can be learned from this section is that Western portfolio managers check a whole
catalogue of criteria when they consider to invest in a CEE country. Liquidity of the individ-
ual stock emerges as the most important criterion. But also managerial qualification, a pre-
condition for an appropriate return on investment, and stability of the political, legal and fi-
nancial systems, determinants of the general risk of the investment, are important. The de-
tailed analysis shows that all CEE countries have their specific problems. But generally, Hun-
gary and Poland emerge as the relatively best-performing countries. This is consistent with
the quantitative importance of Hungarian and Polish assets in the Western portfolios. Vice
versa, the smaller fraction of Czech and Russian assets in the portfolios might reflect the rela-
tively bad grades these economies achieved. Section 4 will analyze this issue quantitatively.
4 Empirical Results
This section attempts to identify the driving factors of portfolio investment in the CEE coun-
tries. Formally speaking, the endogenous variable is the fraction of shares each fund holds in
each of the six CEE countries. Exogenous variables are the country-specific grades on each
criterion as assigned by each fund manager. We therefore estimate the following Model 1:
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 Survey participants report that they hold an average size of only 0.5-1 percent of outstanding shares.
10
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for i = 1, ..., I  and  t = CZ, H, PL, EST, SLO and RUS.
Hereby, yit represents the fraction of shares held by investor i in country t. In Model 1 the in-
tercept  is assumed to be constant over all six equations but this assumption will be dropped
below. Each yit is explained by a set of J exogenous variables. The coefficients  are assumed
to be constant over all six countries. Hence, one equation is estimated for all six countries.
This assumption is also dropped in Model 2:
it
J
1j
ijtjttit xy ++=
=
for i = 1, ..., I  and  t = CZ, H, PL, EST, SLO and RUS.
In Model 2, the intercept  and the coefficients may vary from country to country. This is
appropriate when the exogenous variables influence the endogenous variable differently from
country to country. Hence, one equation for each country will be estimated in Model 2.
4.1 Construction of the Exogenous Variables
20
20
 See Table 2.
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• Stability of the legal system
• Competence of management
• Liquidity of the individual stock
We chose to select one criterion from each category because the categories are supposed to
catch different aspects of the investment decision. Stability of the legal system describes the
general risk associated with an investment, competence of management the return to be ex-
pected whereas liquidity is the third characteristic that is generally checked for investment
decisions (Steiger, 2000). 21
As exogenous variables six dummies are calculated according to the following definitions:
1Dijt =
1Dijt =
 22
23
21
22
23
12
down the 20 initial grading variables to only three common factors. 24 Table 7 shows which
initial variables are grouped together in common factors when PFA is performed.
Table 7: Composition of the Common Factors
Factor 1: General Risk Factor 2: Return Potential Factor 3: Institutional Risk
• Stability of political system
• Stability of financial system
• Productivity
• Protection of minority share-
holders
• Regulation of privatization
• Management competence
• Quality of bankruptcy law
• Clearness of legislation
• Enforcement of law
• Clearing & Settlement
• Treatment of domestic vs.
foreign investors
• Disclosure rules
• Control on capital flows
Notes: The variables are ranked by the size of their loading. Only variables with a loading above 0.60 were
considered.
The composition of variables is quite diverse for the second, but not for the first and third
25
4.2 Regression Results
24
 A minimum value of 1.00 was required for the individual Eigenvalues. This is a commonly applied critical
value. All calculations were performed with STATA 6.0.
25
 Note that stock market liquidity is not detected by PFA as a relevant variable in any of the three common fac-
tors. This is mainly due to the low variation of grades on this criterion.
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results (Model 1)
Specification (1) Six Dummy Variables (2) Three Common Factors
from PFA
Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Constant 16.990** (3.670) 17.860** (1.948)
Dummy1:  Stability of legal system (+) 8.503** (3.812) --
Dummy2: Management Competence (+) 7.210* (4.210) --
Dummy3: Stock Market Liquidity (+) 8.711 (5.718) --
Dummy4: Stability of legal system (-) -1.732 (4.379) --
Dummy5: Management Competence (-) 4.319 (3.769) --
Dummy6: Stock Market Liquidity (-) -15.476** (3.308) --
General Risk -- 2.621 (2.140)
Return Potential -- 2.934 (2.042)
Institutional Risk -- 5.589** (2.121)
Number of Observations
Adjusted R2
76
39.74%
65
11.64%
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels of 5% (**) and 10% (*) respectively were used. (+)
indicates the dummies for the positive influence and (-) the dummies for the negative influence respectively (see
definitions above).
We see from Table 8 that the fraction of assets held by a fund manager in a particular country
is significantly influenced by specific criteria. Looking at the results from the first specifica-
tion of the exogenous variables (second column) we find that fund managers who think that a
country has a high stability of its legal system increase their investment by 8.5 percent on av-
erage. Likewise, when a fund manager thinks that stock market liquidity in a particular coun-
2
2
Ceteris paribus
14
provements on these criteria from the side of a CEE country could therefore contribute to
higher foreign portfolio investment in that country.
Since about 20 percent of the observations on the endogenous variable have the value zero,
we also ran a Tobit model.26 Tobit models correct for a potential bias in the estimated coeffi-
cients due to censored data. In our case, data are left-censored with the value zero. However,
significance of coefficients shows to be robust in the Tobit estimation; coefficients slightly
increase in absolute value.
The next step in our analysis is to check whether coefficients are country-specific, i.e. if
Model 2 might be more appropriate instead of Model 1. This is accomplished by constructing
a SURE model as formulated by Zellner (1962). We estimate a system of six seemingly un-
related regressions (SURE) and obtain the variance-covariance matrix of all coefficients and
all residuals. This allows us to perform joint tests on coefficients. Additionally, if the error
terms from all six countries were correlated, estimating six country-specific equations sepa-
rately would be inefficient. The SURE model addresses this problem by estimating the six
equations simultaneously with a GLS approach.  27
Before we look at the estimation results from the SURE model we check whether the error
terms are correlated in our sample, i.e. if SURE is necessary. The test developed by Breusch
and Pagan (1980) is appropriate here. Applying the Breusch-Pagan test to the first specifica-
tion we cannot reject the independence of the six equations at the 10 percent level, whereas
for the second specification independence is rejected at the 5 percent level. This suggests that
the six equations should be estimated jointly in a SURE model when the PFA results are used
as exogenous variables. In turn, six separate regressions can be run in the case of the first
specification using simple OLS models. It must be noted here that the number of cases in the
second specification is very low (N=48) because a missing value in any of the 20 original
variables will cause a whole observation to be dropped. Since efficiency of estimation is a
large sample property the result from the Breusch-Pagan test should be interpreted with some
caution.
A second indicator on the necessity of estimating the six equations jointly in a SURE model
provide the joint tests of coefficients as displayed in Table 9.
                                                
26
 See Tobin (1958) for the econometric technique applied in this estimation procedure.
27
 See Greene (1997: 674-703) for a formal description of the feasible generalized least squares technique ap-
plied in SURE models.
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Table 9: Joint Tests on Country-Specific Coefficients (SURE Model)
Specification (1) Six Dummy Variables (2) Three Common Factors
from PFA
F-Test Level of Sign. F-Test Level of Sign.
Constant 301.80 0.0000 269.90 0.000
Dummy1:  Stability of legal system (+) 43.50 0.0000 -- --
Dummy2: Management Competence (+) 20.97 0.0008 -- --
Dummy3: Stock Market Liquidity (+) 7.77 0.0206 -- --
Dummy4: Stability of legal system (-) 14.75 0.0006 -- --
Dummy5: Management Competence (-) 11.23 0.0470 -- --
Dummy6: Stock Market Liquidity (-) 78.88 0.0000 -- --
General Risk -- -- 4.23 0.5164
Return Potential -- -- 3.93 0.5601
Institutional Risk -- -- 16.66 0.0052
Number of Observations 54 48
Notes: Due to collinearity of some exogenous variables some constraints need to be dropped in the joint tests.
As a consequence the critical values of the F-tests are not constant over all tests. Therefore the levels of signifi-
cance are displayed additionally. See also footnotes of Table 8.
The hypothesis that the coefficients on the six dummy variables as used in the first specifica-
tion are equal across all six countries can be rejected on a very high level of significance. This
confirms that a separate regression should be run for each country. For the second specifica-
tion, equality of the coefficients cannot be rejected for the variables general risk and return
potential. Econometrically this means that only the coefficient on institutional risk varies sig-
nificantly between the six countries. Economically this means that investors tend to generate
their investment decisions according to the same criteria across all six countries. Only institu-
tional risk seems to have a country-specific influence on investment.
Table 10 and Table 11, respectively, present the results from OLS country-specific regres-
sions for the first specification and from the SURE model for the second specification.
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Table 10: Country-Specific Coefficients (OLS, six dummies as exogenous variables)
Czech Re-
public
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia
Constant 40.739**
(4.800)
20.597**
(6.259)
23.245**
(8.872)
1.893
(1.224)
5.695**
(1.453)
22.581**
(6.897)
Stability of legal system (+) 10.224
(5.615)
19.140**
(6.300)
11.977
(8.731)
1.340
(1.499)
-1.695
(0.951)
dropped
Management Competence (+) -34.401**
(11.567)
4.422
(5.513)
3.326
(8.919)
-0.144
(1.836)
-1.316
(1.098)
-8.036
(13.795)
Stock Market Liquidity (+) dropped -2.321
(5.534)
1.350
(8.731)
dropped dropped dropped
Stability of legal system (-) 5.278
(4.885)
dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Management Competence (-) -32.983**
(7.210)
-9.334
(7.754)
-3.811
(8.491)
-0.296
(2.290)
0.001
(1.228)
-16.609*
(8.725)
Stock Market Liquidity (-) 2.021
(5.539)
dropped 18.589
(14.102)
-1.597
(1.499)
-4.000**
(1.228)
4.523
(7.556)
Number of Observations 14 14 14 10 10 14
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels of 5% (**) and 10% (*) respectively were used.
As to be expected, when fund mangers think that a country performs well on a specific crite-
17
competent but at the same time holds only a very small fraction of Czech shares in the portfo-
lio. 28
The coefficient of the intercept measures the average fraction of a particular country as owned
by the reference category. Comparing the estimated coefficients with Table 1 suggests that in
practice the average investor does not belong to the reference category and that the intercept
coefficient should therefore not be interpreted further. 29
A number of variables had to be dropped from the OLS estimation procedure as can also be
seen from Table 10. This is a result of high collinearity among the exogenous variables. To
address this problem PFA was conducted. Results from the SURE model with the common
factors as obtained through PFA estimation are as follows:
Table 11: Country-Specific Coefficients (SURE, exogenous variables from PFA)
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Estonia Slovenia Russia
Constant 14.871**
(2.265)
30.204**
(5.208)
36.883**
(3.825)
0.815
(0.468)
0.696
(0.856)
11.839
(10.109)
General Risk 1.094
(1.742)
2.319
(3.530)
3.355
(3.340)
-0.679
(0.446)
-0.367
(0.867)
1.733
(8.859)
Return Potential 2.388
(1.467)
4.860
(3.060)
-0.665
(2.070)
1.087**
(0.316)
1.845**
(0.867)
4.203
(4.451)
Institutional Risk -4.755**
(2.271)
6.095**
(2.319)
0.833
(3.096)
-0.252
(0.312)
0.289
(0.420)
-2.090
(2.036)
Number of Observations 8 8 8 8 8 8
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels of 5% (**) and 10% (*) respectively were used.
Table 11 presents regression results from the SURE model which estimated the six country-
specific equations simultaneously. The advantage of eliminating the existing correlation be-
tween the error terms and of capturing all variables in three orthogonal exogenous variables
comes at a significant cost: the number of observations with no missing values decreases to 8
per equation. The reason is that 13 out of the total 21 observations had missing values on one
or more items checked in the survey.
The tests performed above (Table 9) suggested that the coefficients on general risk and return
potential do not differ significantly across the countries. We therefore tested additionally if
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 The significance of coefficients did not change when Tobit models were estimated instead; estimated coeffi-
cients increased slightly in absolute value. In addition, only for Poland we find a positive influence of legal sta-
bility on the 10 percent-level of significance.
29
 In addition, the intercept catches the average value of any missing variables.
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these coefficients are significantly different from zero. For the coefficient on general risk we
find that it is not significantly different from zero on the 10 percent-level, whereas the coeffi-
cient on return potential is larger than zero on the 1 percent-level. This means that factors like
high productivity, managerial competence and growth significantly contribute to higher in-
vestment. In particular, investment in Estonia (+1.1 percent) and Slovenia (+1.8 percent) is
significantly higher due to a good return potential.
The joint tests as displayed in Table 9 also suggested that the influence of institutional risk is
country-specific. This is confirmed by the results in Table 11. The degree of institutional risk,
i.e. the risk of a lower return as a result of poor clearing and settlement, unfair treatment of
domestic versus foreign investors or controls on capital flows has a country-specific influence
on investment. The fraction of assets invested in Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Russia is not
significantly influenced by the degree of institutional risk. But Hungary was able to attract
significantly higher investment due to a high quality of financial market rules that helped in-
vestors to trust in the prospects of the Hungarian economy. In turn, in the Czech Republic a
higher quality of financial market rules seems to decrease investment. This counterintuitive
result is again caused by an outlier: one investor holding a very high fraction of Czech assets
assigned a very bad grade to the rules in the Czech financial market.
In contrast to the results in Table 10, the intercept coefficient in Table 11 can be interpreted as
the average fraction of shares held in a particular country by  all investors. The reason is that
PFA produces normally distributed common factors. Comparing the estimated coefficients
with Table 1 confirms this reasoning.
Taking together all results, we find that the CEE portfolio structure of Western investment
funds can be explained by specific criteria. In particular, a stable legal system, high manage-
rial competence and sufficient liquidity in the stock market all contribute to higher portfolio
investment. Considering more than these three criteria does not improve the explanatory
power of our model but stresses the importance of financial market rules (Table 8). Differen-
tiating by country shows that in Hungary the stability of the legal system primarily drives in-
vestment (Table 10). In turn, low managerial competence limits investment in the Czech Re-
public and Russia, low stock market liquidity hinders investment in Slovenia. Using the
grading data on all criteria we find that investment in the smaller economies of Estonia and
Slovenia is primarily driven by a sound return potential (which, in turn, is based on manage-
rial competence and high productivity) and by a high quality of financial markets rules in
Hungary (e.g. fair treatment of foreign vs. domestic shareholders, efficient clearing and set-
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tlement). However, since the number of observations for the country-specific analyses is low,
the latter results should be interpreted cautiously.
5 Conclusions
The intent of this study is two-fold: First, we want to know which factors determine portfolio
investment in CEE countries, and second, how the current CEE portfolio structure of Western
institutional investors can be explained.
We find that Western portfolio managers check a whole catalogue of criteria before they con-
duct investment in CEE countries. We identify three groups of criteria: the general risk of an
investment which mainly is measured by stability of the financial and the legal system of a
particular country. The  return potential as the second group is determined by managerial
competence, high productivity of the investment target but also by efficient regulation of pri-
vatization. Third,  institutional risk is created by unfair treatment of domestic versus foreign
shareholders, inefficient clearing and settlement and controls on capital flows. A criterion
mentioned by almost all investors as very important is liquidity in the stock market. However,
our principal factor analysis does not identify this criterion as important.30
The descriptive analysis shows that mainly a low return potential and a high risk from the
institutional setting in the financial markets limits investment. According to survey respon-
dents, the Czech Republic and Russia offer less qualified managers combined with reduced
productivity and competitive pressure in the product markets. In the financial markets, inves-
tors are dissatisfied with Czech, Russian, but also with Slovenian and some specific Polish
30
 A reason for this might be that the variance in the grading data is very low on this item. PFA selects only those
variables that have a relatively high variance.
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Running country-specific regressions instead we find that there is some evidence of heteroge-
neity between the countries. OLS regressions suggest that investment in Hungary is driven by
stability of the legal system. In contrast, investment in the Czech Republic and Russia seems
to be barred by low managerial competence, and low stock market liquidity in Slovenia. Es-
timating a system of six seemingly unrelated regressions (one for each of the six CEE coun-
tries) improves econometric efficiency of estimation but reduces the number of observations
significantly. This approach indicates that investment is driven by a sound return potential in
Estonia and Slovenia, and low institutional risk in Hungary. Overall, the main results from our
descriptive analysis are confirmed by the econometric analysis: Hungary is most attractive to
foreign portfolio investors, and the Czech Republic and Russia least attractive. A high quality
of financial market rules, a liquid stock market, and a sound return potential support are im-
portant preconditions for high levels of portfolio investment.
Comparing the descriptive results with the results from the econometric analyses shows that
both analytical methods can be used with our data. The advantage of the econometric ap-
proach is that the net effect of individual factors on portfolio investment can be calculated.
We learn, for example, that investment in the smaller economies of Estonia and Slovenia is
mainly driven by their potential for good returns. For the larger economies of Hungary and
the Czech Republic the setting of the financial markets seems to be more relevant. However,
all country-specific results are based on small samples and should therefore be interpreted
with some caution.
This study points out several avenues for prospective future research. Since institutional in-
vestment is constantly increasing on a global scale and since CEE enterprises tend to rely
more on equity finance than Western enterprises, the effects of Western portfolio investment
should be analyzed more closely. Interesting could be a detailed analysis of the interaction of
Western portfolio managers and CEE companies. Most survey respondents indicate that they
are actively engaged in corporate governance in CEE firms. To our knowledge no study ana-
lyzed yet this shareholder activism in CEE companies. Empirical studies on US firms suggest
that these activities can increase shareholder value.31
Another valuable extension of this study could be the analysis of investment in particular
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folio investment. Finally, it could be interesting to incorporate push-factors that also can in-
fluence investment. This would not only require data on fund-specific liquidity or degree of
competition in the fund industry but also a model on the allocation of capital between funds.
                                                                                                                                                        
31
 See Black (1997), Karpoff (1998) and Del Guercio (1999) for comprehensive surveys of the empirical litera-
ture.
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